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The Finance and Growth Nexus
Aubhik Khan*
It is difficult to overemphasize the potential
benefits of economic growth for improving hu-
man welfare. For example, Bangladesh, India,
and Pakistan, three of the world’s lowest income
nations, had real per capita GDP of  $1908,
$1633, and $1793, respectively, in 1992. In con-
trast, the equivalent values for three of the world’s
highest income nations, Denmark, Sweden, and
the United States, were $18,730, $18,387, and
$23,220, respectively.1 So average per capita in-
come in these nations was more than 11 times
that in the poorer nations. Consequently, people
living in these nations could afford a dramati-
cally higher quality of life involving, for example,
the consumption of vastly superior medical care
and education. Unfortunately, if income growth
in the poor nations continues at its average rate
of about 2.84 percent per year—its pace over the
1The measures of real per capita GDP reported here
are taken from the Penn World Tables, which measure
output across nations using a common set of interna-
tional prices to value goods and services.  The data are
available online at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu.  For ad-
ditional information, see the 1991 paper by Robert Sum-
mers and Alan Heston.
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33 years from 1959 to 1992—these nations would
not attain the average current income of the higher
income group until the year 2079. If they could
grow twice as fast, they would reach the current
per capita income level of the richer nations in
half the time.2
Economic growth is driven, in part, by firms’
investments in physical plant and equipment
and the research and development of new tech-
nologies. Often, investment projects are too costly
for firms to finance solely with their retained
earnings; in such cases, projects must be financed
using the available savings of households. Dif-
ferences in the information available to house-
holds relative to that available to firms and costs
of transactions impede the flow of savings into
investment. Information costs arise, for example,
when households attempt to distinguish be-
tween investment opportunities offered by firms
in order to isolate the most worthwhile projects.
A firm incurs a transaction cost, for example,
when its managers expend effort locating po-
tential investors.
Financial markets and intermediaries—the fi-
nancial system—can raise a household’s return
on investment and, thus, perhaps the total quan-
tity of investment supplied by reducing the costs
associated with lending to firms. The extent of
the financial system describes the proportion of
firms and households able to easily access the
services provided by financial markets and in-
termediaries. The efficiency of the financial sys-
tem refers to how effective these markets and in-
termediaries are in reducing information and
transaction costs for their customers. Economists
refer to improvements in the extent or efficiency
of the financial system as financial development.
(See The Extent of Financial Development.)
CONTROVERSY OVER THE IMPORTANCE
OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Walter Bagehot’s book provides an early dis-
cussion of financial development, emphasizing
its importance for economic growth.  In his study
Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market,
originally published in 1873, Bagehot argues that
the distinguishing characteristic of English fi-
nancial markets was the relative ease with which
they were able to mobilize savings to finance a
variety of long-term, illiquid investment oppor-
tunities. This easy entrepreneurial access to ex-
ternal finance was critical in facilitating the
implementation of new technologies in England.
This early notion that financial development
may play a critical role in economic growth has
not been uniformly accepted. Indeed, there has
been considerable debate on the direction of cau-
sation: does economic growth lead to more
highly developed financial systems, or does fi-
nancial development lead to greater economic
growth? Adherents to the first view argue that
financial markets and institutions appear when
needed: when economies grow, business demand
for financial services increases and the finan-
cial sector expands in response.3 An alternative
view is that financial development is not only a
result but also an important determinant of eco-
nomic development. Researchers holding this
view accept that the financial sector responds to
the increased demand for financial services that
occurs as an economy develops.  However, they
stress that there may also be independent
changes in the level of financial development—
for example, in response to changes in govern-
ment policies—and that such changes may spur
further economic growth. In particular, they ar-
2Of course, the rich group is also growing, and in-
deed, as a group they’ve grown at the slightly faster rate
of 2.91 percent per year, over the same period.  Hence,
the poor nations described above will never actually over-
take the rich group unless their rates of growth rise suf-
ficiently.  For example, if the rate of growth for Bangladesh,
India, and Pakistan could be doubled to 5.68 percent a
year, they would overtake Denmark, Sweden, and the
United States in the year 2083. 3See, for example, the 1952 book by Joan Robinson.The Finance and Growth Nexus Aubhik Khan
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The Extent of Financial Development (1976 - 93)
The United States economy has a relatively well-developed financial sector.  Measures of the extent
of the financial system, which provide estimates of the quantity of external finance available, are
relatively high. Consider two sources of external finance.  Stock markets allow firms to finance
current investment by selling shares in future earnings. Loans from banks and other financial inter-
mediaries are an alternative source of finance. For the United States, stock market capitalization,
which measures the total value of all shares outstanding, was, on average, 0.57 times GDP over the
period 1976– 93. Domestic bank credit to the private sector, essentially loans made to nongovernment
enterprises, was 0.77 times GDP over the same period. The sum of these two values yields a measure
of financial development for the United States equal to 1.34.  In contrast, for Bangladesh this measure
is just 0.28 times GDP.  Interestingly, market capitalization is only about 0.01 of this total; domestic
credit comprises the remainder.  While debt is generally a larger source of investment financing than
equity in most countries, the predominance of debt finance in Bangladesh is extreme (see table).
Country Bank Credit  Stock Market The Extent
as a Fraction + Capitalization = of Financial
of GDP   as a Fraction of GDP Development
Luxembourg 2.27 2.45 4.72
Singapore 1.50 1.29 2.79
Japan 1.96 0.66 2.62
Hong Kong 1.19 1.24 2.43
United States 0.77 0.57 1.34
Sweden 0.87 0.31 1.18
Denmark 0.69 0.19 0.87
India 0.46 0.10 0.55
Pakistan 0.45 0.07 0.53
Bangladesh 0.27 0.01 0.28
gue that a poorly functioning financial system
may hamper development, but an efficient one
can boost the rate of growth above what it other-
wise would have been.
This article discusses some recent evidence
that appears to support this second viewpoint:
financial development may have a significant
impact on a nation’s rate of economic growth.4
Thus, poor nations, or those in transition to mar-
ket economies, may be able to sustain higher rates
of growth by avoiding policies that frustrate the
development of the financial system.  Addition-
ally, economies with such policies already in
place may stimulate economic development by
eliminating them. (See Financial Repression.)  A
stronger interpretation of the evidence—that
policymakers may actually be able to boost rates
4For an excellent and accessible survey of this evi-
dence, the interested reader should consult Ross Levine’s
1997 paper, on which this article has drawn heavily.6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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Financial Repression
A famous example of economic policies that
distort financial markets is the phenomenon of
financial repression first discussed by Ronald I.
McKinnon in his 1973 book.  In some less de-
veloped economies, government policy sought
to promote targeted industries, ones consid-
ered important for rapid development, by al-
lowing them to borrow cheaply. This often re-
sulted in excessive and inefficient investment in
such industries. Less favored sectors of the
economy could not obtain investment financ-
ing for worthwhile projects.   The consequence
was a misallocation of funds that reduced the
overall return to investment in the economy,
since many productive opportunities were left
unfunded while unproductive projects in tar-
geted industries obtained funds.
In chapter 6 of his book, McKinnon discusses
the case of Ethiopia, where the government
capped the nominal interest rate on bank loans
at 12 percent. This interest rate was too low to
clear the market for investment loans. Conse-
quently, an arbitrary system of loan allocation
arose whereby firms in strategic industries tar-
geted by the government, such as manufactur-
ing and hotel building, experienced excessive
investment that generated poor returns for sav-
ers. At the same time, farmers were unable to
obtain short-term loans from banks. Instead,
they had to borrow from informal moneylend-
ers who charged them 100 to 200 percent a year.
of growth by devoting resources to subsidizing
the development of the financial system—is more
controversial, and the evidence to date is not
strong enough to support this interpretation.
WHAT DOES THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
DO AND HOW COULD IT PROMOTE
ECONOMIC GROWTH?
To understand how the financial system might
influence economic growth, we need to review
the roles of the financial system in greater detail.
First, the financial system mobilizes savings. Since
an individual saver may be unable or unwilling
to completely fund a borrower, financial mar-
kets and institutions pool the savings of diverse
households and make these funds available for
lending. This activity reduces the transaction
costs associated with external finance for both
firms and households. By going directly to a fi-
nancial institution, firms seeking to borrow avoid
the costs of having to contact a diverse group of
savers. Similarly, savers avoid the costs of evalu-
ating every potential borrower by placing their
funds with a financial institution.
Second, the financial system allocates savings
by determining which borrowers obtain loans.
Since financial institutions are specialists, they
can determine worthwhile investment opportu-
nities and judge the creditworthiness of borrow-
ers at lower cost than the average small investor.
The third role of the financial system is to re-
duce risk by spreading investors’ savings across
many different investment opportunities.
Spreading savings diversifies risk for house-
holds and reduces their exposure to the uncer-
tainty associated with individual projects.  This
reduction in risk encourages savings.
The fourth role of the financial system derives
from its ability to generate liquidity. Some invest-
ments with potentially high returns involve
projects that require long-term commitments of
capital. However, some investors may unexpect-
edly need access to their savings. Fortunately,
when the financial system pools the investments
of many households, it allocates funds to both
short- and long-term projects. Thus, investors
obtain higher returns on their savings than they
would if their investments were limited to short-
term projects, but they still have access to their
savings in unforeseen circumstances. Further,
mixing investments in this way ensures that
worthwhile long-term projects are funded.5
Sixth, the financial system facilitates trade by
extending credit and guaranteeing payments.
For example, currency, demand deposits, and
credit card accounts all allow individuals to ex-The Finance and Growth Nexus Aubhik Khan
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change goods and services without having to
resort to barter.  Additionally, letters of credit help
firms order the inputs for current production
when they experience delays in payment for past
sales.
The financial system also exerts corporate con-
trol and monitors managers.  Entrepreneurs’ or
managers’ information about the operation and
outcome of their projects tends to be superior to
information that outside creditors and share-
holders have.  Insiders’ attempts to exploit this
informational advantage by engaging in oppor-
tunistic behavior would tend to discourage sav-
ings. For example, managers might underreport
their firms’ profits to lenders and shareholders
in order to raise their own earnings.  To offset
this information advantage, banks monitor bor-
rowers, and equity markets allow shareholders
to discipline managers by voting out poor man-
agement.
These roles suggest that a well-functioning
financial system might permit a higher level of
saving and investment and, therefore, economic
growth.
THE EVIDENCE FOR CAUSALITY
The earliest examination of the relationship
between finance and growth across countries
was a 1969 study by Raymond Goldsmith. Gold-
smith used the value of financial intermediary
assets, relative to GNP, as a measure of financial
development.  Examining data on 35 countries
over 103 years (1860 – 1963) he found that, in
general, financial and economic development
appeared to occur simultaneously.  Although
Goldsmith’s measure of financial development
would be correlated with the extent of financial
services, it’s less likely that it would be closely
related to the quality of those services.  Unfortu-
nately, the paucity of data on the quality of fi-
nancial services makes its measurement prob-
lematic for any study of financial development.
A further difficulty in Goldsmith’s study is that
he did not control for the many other factors that,
at least in part, determine the rate of economic
growth. Economic theory indicates that a
nation’s propensity to save, supply of human
capital, fiscal and monetary policy, political and
economic stability, the rule of law, the rate of
population growth, and the initial level of GDP
are all possible determinants of an economy’s
rate of growth.
Perhaps the most thorough study of finance
and growth in the tradition of Goldsmith is the
1993 work of Robert King and Ross Levine.  This
work remedied many of the problems of the origi-
nal study.  Acknowledging the lack of good mea-
sures of overall financial development, the au-
thors examined a variety of alternatives.  They
used four measures.  Two of these measures are
intended to gauge the extent of the financial sec-
tor: liquid liabilities of the financial system as a
fraction of GDP; and the quantity of credit pro-
vided to private enterprises, by both private-sec-
tor banks and the central bank, as a fraction of
GDP.6  King and Levine also used two measures
of the efficiency of the financial system.  The first
measured the share of total credit actually pro-
vided by private-sector banks instead of the cen-
tral bank. The second measured the share of to-
tal credit allocated to private nonfinancial firms.
Implicit in the use of these two measures is the
belief that an economy with more lending by
private-sector banks and more lending to pri-
5In his famous and influential 1969 study, Sir John
Hicks (page 144) emphasized the importance of this role
of the financial system during the English Industrial Revo-
lution.  Extending Walter Bagehot’s theme that financial
development facilitates adoption of technology, Hicks
argued that financial development, in particular the in-
creased provision of liquidity, allowed the adoption of
new technologies, such as the steam engine, that required
long-term investment.
6Liquid liabilities of the financial system include cur-
rency held outside the banking system as well as de-
mand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-
bank financial intermediaries.8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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vate firms will have a more efficient allocation of
external finance.  A private-sector bank, seeking
to maximize profits, is likelier to fund worth-
while investment projects than is a government
lender that may have to follow another criterion
for loan evaluation.
King and Levine also used three separate mea-
sures of economic growth: the per capita growth
rates of both GDP and the capital stock and the
growth rate of total factor productivity.7  Finally,
to isolate the effect of financial development, they
controlled for several alternative determinants
of economic development.  That is, they evalu-
ated the ability of the measures of financial de-
velopment discussed above to explain that part
of an economy’s overall rate of growth not al-
ready explained by other
factors. The authors
found a positive and sta-
tistically significant rela-
tionship between their
measures of financial de-
velopment and economic
growth; in other words,
countries with higher lev-
els of financial develop-
ment tend to have higher
economic growth and
vice versa. (See Financial
Development and Economic
Growth Across Countries.)
The issue of causality
remains.  Does finance
cause growth?  In other
words, do higher levels of
financial development
Financial Development and Economic Growth
Across Countries
For a sample of 47 countries over the period 1976 - 91, the figure on page 9
plots the unexplained component of economic growth against a measure of the
contemporaneous level of the extent of financial development. Unexplained
growth is the remaining component of average annual growth of per capita
GDP that is not explained by a set of nonfinancial factors.  The data are from the
1998 paper by Ross Levine and Sara Zervos.  The nonfinancial factors are (1)
initial GDP per capita, (2) secondary school enrollment, (3) a measure of political
stability, (4) government spending relative to GDP, (5) inflation, and (6) the
black market exchange rate premium. Financial development is measured as
the sum of stock market capitalization and domestic bank credit to the private
sector, each divided by GDP. This measure of financial development differs
from that used by King and Levine in that it includes stock market data.  Higher
values of this variable indicate larger stock markets and more lending, relative
to the size of the economy. This is commonly assumed to imply a higher level of
external finance.
The figure clearly shows that, on average, nations characterized by higher
levels of financial development, as measured along the horizontal axis, also
exhibited higher growth rates than could be explained by nonfinancial factors,
as measured along the vertical axis.
independently generate economic growth? Or
does financial development come about only as
a result of economic development? If financial
development causes economic development,
policies that hinder the formation of those mar-
kets and financial intermediaries may reduce
long-term growth rates.  For example, such poli-
cies could include imposing disproportionately
large taxes on financial firms relative to other
corporations.  Reforms that eliminate
distortionary policies may promote growth and
development to an extent that more than com-
pensates for the revenue lost.
Goldsmith was skeptical that researchers
would ever be able to resolve the issue of causal-
ity. Nonetheless, King and Levine do provide
7Total factor productivity
growth is the part of GDP
growth that cannot be ex-
plained by changes in the capi-
tal stock or hours worked.The Finance and Growth Nexus Aubhik Khan
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evidence to suggest a causal relationship be-
tween finance and growth.  Their data indicate
that the initial level of financial development in
1960 predicted the subsequent average rate of
economic growth over the next 29 years across
countries.  In other words, economies that were
more financially developed at the beginning of
the period experienced, on average, more rapid
growth.  This finding supports the views of re-
searchers who feel that financial development
causes economic growth.  (See Financial Develop-
ment Predicts Economic Growth.)  But this is not
conclusive evidence of causality, since the ini-
tial level of financial development may respond
to how participants in the economy expect the
rate of economic growth to change in the future.
CAUSALITY REVISITED
Despite the finding by King and Levine that
financial development predicts economic
growth, skepticism is still justified.  As discussed
in the 1998 work of Raghuram Rajan and Luigi
Zingales, two possible sources of error prevent
researchers from using evidence that finance
predicts growth to conclude that it determines
growth.   The first source of error involves the
role of expectations; the second, the possibility
of important omitted factors.
Expectations of future economic development
may induce current financial development.  If
entrepreneurs anticipate future economic
growth, which will mean higher demand for fi-
nancial services, they may invest in the creation
of additional financial in-
termediaries today in an-
ticipation of future profits.
In this scenario, finance is
completely determined by
growth but precedes it.
The other source of er-
ror lies in the possibility
of missing factors.  A vari-
able such as the savings
rate might determine both
current financial develop-
ment and future economic
growth. Generally, an
economy with a younger
population, provided it is
not too young, will tend
to save more relative to
GDP—and thus supply a
greater quantity of exter-
nal finance—than an
economy with an older
population.  The financial
system will expand to al-
locate the higher supply
of savings, and so the
economy will be more fi-
nancially developed.
Moreover, if these funds10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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are then invested in
projects that promote
growth, we will see a
higher subsequent growth
rate for the economy.  In
this case, finance does not
cause growth at all. Both
are driven by demo-
graphic structure; yet, the
data will again indicate fi-
nance precedes growth.
Rajan and Zingales at-
tempted to address the is-




Since the financial system
helps reduce the informa-
tion and transaction costs
associated with the exter-
nal financing of invest-
ment, the authors argue




tries that rely more on ex-
ternal finance, as opposed
to retained earnings, for investment.  In such in-
dustries it generally takes longer for investments
to yield cash flows. Thus, financial development
should have a stronger impact on industries
such as drugs and pharmaceuticals, plastics, and
computers, which typically require large
amounts of external funding for R&D, than on
the tobacco industry, which requires little.8 Spe-
cifically, industries with a greater need for exter-
nal finance should grow relatively faster in more
financially developed economies than in less fi-
nancially developed ones.
To test their hypothesis, the authors had to
address two issues of measurement. First, they
had to determine industries’ need for external
finance. They did this using data for U.S. firms,
under the assumption that U.S. financial mar-
kets are sufficiently developed so as to provide
each industry with its desired level of external
finance. Second, to implement their test, Rajan
and Zingales had to measure financial develop-
ment. As an alternative to the measures used by
King and Levine, Rajan and Zingales measured
a nation’s extent of financial development by
the size of its stock market plus the amount of
credit provided by the banking sector relative to
the country’s GDP.9  They also measured the effi-
ciency of the financial sector using an index of
Financial Development Predicts
Economic Growth
The figure on page 11 illustrates the result that the initial level of the extent of
financial development helps determine future economic growth. The unexplained
growth rate computed in the figure on page 9 is plotted against the initial level of
financial development, in 1976. Note the positive relationship between the initial
level of financial development and subsequent economic growth summarized by
the regression line.
The data presented in the figure here imply a regression coefficient for finan-
cial development equal to 1.86. This means that a one-percentage-point rise in a
nation’s level of financial development tends to raise its annual rate of per capita
economic growth by almost twice that amount. For example, Bangladesh’s initial
level of financial development in 1976 was 0.07. But suppose it had instead an
initial value of financial development equal to that of the United States, 1.34.
According to the regression, in this second scenario, Bangladesh would have
grown 2 percentage points more each year over the next 17 years than it actually
did. This is a short span in the history of economic development, but it would
have been sufficient to allow the poor nation to raise its per capita income more
than 43 percent.
The results are weaker, though still significant, when the three countries with
the highest measured levels of financial development, Hong Kong, Luxembourg,
and Singapore (all of which provide a large percentage of their financial services
to nonresidents), are eliminated from the regression. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the model examined here is intentionally simple. As such, it abstracts
from the effect of economic growth onto financial development. The absence of
such effects in the model may exaggerate the importance of initial financial devel-
opment on subsequent economic growth.
8Rajan and Zingales (1998), page 560 and Table 1.The Finance and Growth Nexus Aubhik Khan
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the quality of accounting standards in the coun-
try. Better accounting standards help overcome
the informational problems associated with pro-
viding external finance and lead to a more effi-
cient financial system.
Rajan and Zingales used a statistical ap-
proach that ameliorated the problem of omitting
explanatory variables and controlled for the size
of each industry. They found that it was indeed
the case that industries that were more depen-
dent on external finance tended to grow faster in
nations that were more financially developed
than in those that were
less financially devel-
oped. Another interesting
finding was that within
industries, financial de-
velopment was more im-
portant for young firms.
Since such firms were
more likely to have a need
for external finance, the





dence on a specific way
that finance may promote
economic growth: by re-
ducing the costs of exter-
nal finance for firms.
Moreover, since they
looked at particular in-
dustries across a large
number of countries, they
were able to eliminate the
effect of country-specific
and industry-specific fac-
tors that may influence
economic development
but are unobservable to the researcher. This ap-
proach entails difficulties, however.  As an
economy develops, the structure of industry
evolves. In using the United States to estimate
industries’ need for external finance worldwide,
the authors assumed that the process of produc-
tion within industries was essentially invariant
to the level of economic development. If this
strong assumption is not true, doubt is cast on
their measure of an industry’s need for external
finance.  However, the related work of Asli
Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic pro-
vides additional evidence of the importance of
external finance.
Using firm-level data across a number of
economies, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic es-
9This is the same measure we used in the figure on
page 9 and the one above.12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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timated firms’ maximum constrained growth
rates—the maximum rates of growth that firms
may achieve in the absence of access to external
finance for investment. Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic found that a larger proportion of
firms grew above their constrained growth rates
in economies that were more financially devel-
oped.  In particular, economies with relatively
efficient legal systems, active stock markets, and




A possible resolution of the causality contro-
versy may arise from the 1998 work of Rafael
LaPorta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, Andrei
Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. These researchers
exploited the fact that legal systems worldwide
originated from a small group of legal traditions:
English common law, and French, German, or
Scandinavian civil law.  Importantly, legal tra-
ditions do not vary systematically with respect
to a nation’s income or GDP per capita. Rich
and poor economies share similar traditions be-
cause, in many instances, a nation’s colonial
history predetermines its legal system. Nations
also vary widely in the level of investor protec-
tion they offer—that is, the legal rights of share-
holders and creditors—and in how effectively
those rights are enforced.
One example of a legal right that increases
investor protection is proxy voting by mail. The
ability to vote by mail frees shareholders from
the necessity of having to attend shareholder
meetings to vote on management decisions,
thereby raising the likelihood that they will be
able to protect their investment. While this
method of voting is allowed in 40 percent of En-
glish common law nations, it exists in only 5
percent of French civil law nations. Common law
nations are also more likely to enforce one share-
one vote laws that prevent businesses from rais-
ing capital by selling nonvoting shares.  This
ensures that shareholders’ control over a corpo-
ration is proportional to their investment in that
business and that no shareholder is powerless
to influence decisions that affect the value of his
or her investment.
Variations in investors’ rights and protection
across countries cannot be explained solely by
differences in GDP per capita; they are system-
atically related to differences in legal traditions.
This finding that investor protection varies with
legal traditions is important because the degree
of investor protection affects the availability of
external finance. The lack of such protection
raises the risks of investing for outsiders not di-
rectly able to control a firm’s decisions—that is,
small shareholders or creditors. Weak investor
protection fails to reassure creditors and share-
holders that a firm will not engage in opportu-
nistic behavior that will lead to poor returns on
their investment. As a result, investors may re-
duce their supply of external finance, which, in
turn, would reduce the need for financial ser-
vices.  This reduced need would then most likely
result in an equivalent reduction in the size of
the financial system. A relatively smaller finan-
cial system would be associated with a lower
level of financial development.
Thus, the legal tradition of a nation, given its
implication for the rights of investors, is likely to
determine, at least in part, the level of financial
development. In other words, legal tradition can
be used to isolate some part of an economy’s
overall financial development that is indepen-
dent of its current level of economic development.
If this component of financial development is
found to determine economic growth, we finally
have a firm basis for concluding that finance
causes growth.10
Using measures of shareholders’ and credi-
tors’ rights, the enforcement of these rights, and
10This conclusion does require us to assume that the
component of financial development that is independent
of current GDP per capita will also be independent of
future economic growth.The Finance and Growth Nexus Aubhik Khan
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data on overall legal tradition, a 1997 paper by
Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny confirms that
the quantity of external finance is, in part, deter-
mined by legal tradition.  Furthermore, employ-
ing their measures of creditors’ rights, a 1997
paper by Ross Levine shows that these measures
of investor protection can explain a component
of banking-sector development.  This component,
part of the component of overall financial devel-
opment that is independent of per capita GDP, is
itself able to explain some of the observed inter-
national differences in rates of economic growth.
CAVEATS
While the law and finance approach offers
us strong evidence that finance causes growth,
this finding must be viewed with some caution.
For example, one of the measures of creditors’
rights used in these studies presumes that credi-
tors’ rights are stronger in economies that do not
require an automatic stay on a firm’s assets dur-
ing reorganization. An automatic stay on assets,
which prevents liquidation of the firm, harms
secured creditors who have claims to the firm’s
property. However, unsecured creditors, with-
out such claims, benefit from an automatic stay;
preventing liquidation of the firm increases the
probability of their obtaining repayment on their
loan. Thus, it is unclear whether the absence of
an automatic stay on assets is a positive credi-
tors’ right as the authors assume. Moreover, de-
ficiencies in commercial law need not constrain
external financing, since creditors and share-
holders may have contractual rights not required
by law, and firms would have an interest in hon-
oring such agreements to protect their reputa-
tion and thereby their ability to borrow in the
future. Another potential difficulty with the re-
search discussed here is its failure to account for
the role of financial services provided from
abroad. One nation with a relatively underde-
veloped financial system, perhaps due to poor
investor protection, may make extensive use of
the financial services available in another na-
tion. Some economies with unusually high lev-
els of financial development, for example, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Luxembourg, provide ex-
actly such services for other nations.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of an economy’s development,
its financial sector grows in size relative to the
rest of the economy. But whether financial de-
velopment causes economic growth has been dif-
ficult to determine. Recent efforts have accumu-
lated compelling evidence that it does.
The finding that the development of an
economy’s financial system can positively in-
fluence its subsequent rate of economic growth
has implications for economic policy.  In par-
ticular, it indicates a potentially high cost of pur-
suing policies that deter financial development.
While the sheer volume of complementary evi-
dence makes it difficult to reject the thesis that
finance causes growth, there exists, to date, little
work indicating exactly which roles of the fi-
nancial system are most relevant. In fact, al-
though researchers have developed formal theo-
ries of financial development over the last de-
cade, there has been no empirical evaluation of
these theories.11 Thus, we do not yet have a clear
understanding of the mechanism through which
improvements in the extent and efficiency of the
financial system speed economic growth. A
clearer understanding of this causal mechanism
would, of course, be a valuable addition to our
knowledge of the process of economic develop-
ment.
11For formal economic theories that explain the ob-
served interaction between financial and economic de-
velopment, see the 1990 work of Jeremy Greenwood and
Boyan Jovanovic and my 1999 paper.14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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